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Voluntary opposed to involuntary, not to necessary.
—John Locke1
The common notion of liberty is false.
—Anthony Collins2
Naturalistic theories of mind and action are typically considered to be 
recent arrivals on the philosophical scene, in contrast with theories that 
insist on a categorical separation between actions and events, such as agent 
causation, which is typically traced back to Aristotle, and can be found in 
medieval and early modern thinkers such as Francisco Suarez, Samuel 
Clarke, the Cambridge Platonists, Kant, and Reid, to name but a few. For 
example, Clarke declares, “When we say, in vulgar speech, that motives or 
reasons determine a man, ’tis nothing but a mere figure or metaphor. ’Tis 
the man, that freely determines himself to act.”3 The more naturalistically 
oriented species of theories tend to be associated with causal closure argu-
ments derived from early twentieth-century physics, notably as mediated 
through the Vienna Circle. At most, some historical recognition will be 
given to Hobbes’s determinism and Hume’s compatibilism. In what follows 
I wish to show that an original form of compatibilism that acknowledges 
the complexity of mental life was presented by Locke and radicalized by 
his disciple Anthony Collins, in a way unlike either Hobbes before them 
or Hume after them. It may be hoped that a dose of conceptually motivated 
history of philosophy can have a place in contemporary discussions of 
action, whether it is as a presentation of possible “solutions,” unthought-of 
“problems,” or a rejection of the apparent simplicity of either.
In the chapter “Of Power” in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
Locke uses the logic of ideas to construct a complex deflationary challenge 
to mainstream notions of freedom as autonomy or as a capacity associated 
John Locke’s Compatibilism: Suspension of Desire or 
Suspension of Determinism?
Charles T. Wolfe
8838_006.indd   109 5/3/2010   3:15:52 PM
T1
Campbell—Action, Ethics, and Responsibility 
110 C. T. Wolfe
with a distinct faculty called “the Will,” understood as entirely separate 
from the rest of our cognitive functions (Locke 1975, Bk. II, ch. xxi). In a 
famous but mysterious formulation, he says there can be no such thing as 
free will because freedom and will are both “powers,” and there can be no 
such thing as a power of a power. We are free to act or not act, but our 
actions are determined by our will; we are not free to will or not will:
[T]hat which has the power or not the power to operate, is that alone which is or 
is not free, and not the power itself. For freedom, or not freedom, can belong to nothing 
but what has or has not a power to act. (§19, emphasis mine)
Power is, like pleasure or pain, a simple idea of sensation and reflection 
(II.vii.1; xxi.2; xxii.10). In his early drafts for the Essay, Locke had actually 
alternated between “power” and “will” as one of the four simple ideas, 
along with thinking (or perception), pleasure, and pain. He ultimately 
ends up defining will as power plus an act of the mind.4 In any case, by 
stipulating that there cannot be a “power of a power,” Locke is ruling out 
a class of responses to the question “Is the will free?”—namely, ones that 
appeal to divisions within the mind or to higher-order evaluative attitudes 
(Yaffe 2000, 26).
If Locke had let the matter rest there, he would have contributed an 
interesting doctrine to the available “set” of compatibilist moral philoso-
phies—ones that recognize the truth of determinism up to a certain point, 
but consider that this does not rule out the existence of goal-directed, 
intentional human action, and a fortiori action that responds to praise or 
blame, rewards or punishments, and thus is “responsible.”5 But in fact, the 
“Power” chapter is fraught with difficulties, which render it both less 
coherent and more interesting. It is the longest chapter in the Essay, revised 
significantly for each of the four editions of the book, without earlier ver-
sions always being removed, leaving many readers—from Edmund Law, 
Locke’s editor in the eighteenth century, declaring of Locke that
Tho’ he has inserted several Passages in the subsequent Editions, which come near 
to Liberty, yet he takes in the greatest part of his first passive Scheme, and generally 
mixes both together. This has occasioned the greatest confusion in the Chapter 
abovementioned, which cannot but be observ’d by every Reader6
to Leibniz, and today, Vere Chappell—with the feeling that Locke’s account 
is incoherent or at least inconsistent, something Locke himself apologizes 
for at the end of the chapter (§72).7
I shall focus on Locke’s account and its difficulties, but I shall supple-
ment his account in my final discussion with its revision and deterministi-
cally directed critique as put forth by his own closest disciple, the deist 
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Anthony Collins,8 in his Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty 
(1717). Locke’s account contains at least three distinct “theories of 
freedom”; I suggest below that Collins’s reading of this situation and rein-
forcement of one of these theories (the most determinism-friendly one) is 
the most convincing.
Locke starts out with the intellectualist position that we are “determined 
by the Good,” the greater Good, which we know through our understand-
ing (II.xxi.29 in the 1st edition); this is a perfection. But in response to 
Molyneux’s criticism that
you seem to make all Sins proceed from our Understandings . . . ; and not at all 
from the Depravity of our Wills. Now it seems harsh to say, that a Man shall be 
Damn’d, because he understands no better than he does9
Locke introduces a new concept in the second edition, as he writes to 
Molyneux; he now recognizes that “every good, nay every greater good, 
does not constantly move desire, because it may not make, or may not be 
taken to make any necessary part of our happiness; for all that we desire 
is only to be happy.”10 He is now focusing on the causal mechanisms of 
what determines the will and thus moves us to act, in other words, the 
“motivational triggers” of action; this will turn out to be “uneasiness.”
How could we then seek out the Highest Good? How can we “feel” or 
“sense” that the Highest Good is, in fact, our good? Locke originally 
thought that the Highest Good did play a causal role in our actions, so 
that our desire would be “regulated” by the “greatness or smallness of the 
good,”11 (“the greater Good is that alone which determines the Will” 
[§29]), but he gave up this view starting with the second edition, in which 
he adds the category of uneasiness: “good, the greater good, though appre-
hended and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the will, until 
our desire, raised proportionately to it, make us uneasy in the want of it” 
(§35). Thus
[Uneasiness] is the great motive that works on the Mind to put it upon Action, 
which for shortness sake we will call determining of the Will (§29)
and more explicitly,
what . . . determines the Will in regard to our actions is not . . . the greater good in 
view: but some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a man is at 
present under. (§31, 2nd–5th editions)
As my interest is the emergence of a determinist approach to action, 
Locke’s addition of a hedonistic motivational psychology is noteworthy as 
a recognition of determinism, if only a “soft determinism.”12 Whether or 
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not I can rationally judge X (say, a one-month intensive course in classical 
Greek, in a secluded desert setting) to be a greater good than Y (large 
amounts of chocolate and other sweets, several glasses of Cognac, a cigar), 
if obtaining Y removes the greater pressing uneasiness, I will choose Y. This 
is Locke’s way of addressing weakness of will, confirmed by his quotation 
of Ovid’s “Video meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor” (I see the better 
[path], but I choose the worse).13 But in my view, uneasiness is not just an 
explanation for ataraxia; it is Locke’s (2nd edition) explanation for action as 
a whole, and it is his recognition of “micro-determinism” at the subper-
sonal level of action. It’s quite possible for me to choose X over Y, in fact, 
many people do; they simply had a greater pressing uneasiness in that 
direction. As for responsibility, it is unaffected, since God judges all of our 
actions at the time of resurrection, in any case.
Locke always rejects the thesis of the autonomy of the will, according 
to which the will is self-determining; he holds that the will is always deter-
mined “by something without itself.”14 This determination from “without” 
can either be from the Greater Good (1st edition), the most pressing uneasi-
ness (2nd edition), or an interplay between this uneasiness and the last 
judgment of the understanding (2nd–5th editions), and since the Good is 
always defined as happiness (§42), and happiness is always defined as 
pleasure, the “hedonism” that commentators see appearing in the second 
edition is not absent from the first edition. This is why he denies the liberty 
of indifference—the absolute equilibrium of Buridan’s ass, that is, the situ-
ation in which an agent is free if and only if, given all conditions for an 
act A, it can both A and not A, which Leibniz helpfully describes as “indif-
ference of equilibrium”15—as directly contradicting his hedonism (§48). 
For Locke, it is both impossible to be genuinely indifferent, as we are always 
being swayed by one uneasiness or another, and not a good idea to be indif-
ferent, as our ideas of good and evil, translating as they do into pleasure 
and pain, are “in us” for the purpose of our self-preservation:
our All-wise Maker, suitable to our constitution and frame, and knowing what it 
is that determines the Will, has put into Man the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, 
and other natural desires . . . to move and determine their Wills, for the preservation 
of themselves, and the continuation of their Species. . . . We may conclude, that, if 
the bare contemplation of these good ends to which we are carried by these several 
uneasinesses, had been sufficient to determine the will . . . we should have had in 
this World little or no pain at all. (§ 34)
He also claims that the existence of genuine indifference is an impossibil-
ity. It would be useless to be indifferent with regard to the understanding, 
because our actions would then be like “playing the fool” or better, being 
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a “blind agent”;16 moreover, being determined in our choices by the last 
judgment of the understanding is a good idea in terms of our welfare and 
self-preservation.
Now, the actions of an agent who is never indifferent, and whose 
actions are never uncaused, are perfectly compatible with determinism. 
This overall “compatibility” means, I think, that Locke’s vision of action 
and freedom can be understood simply as calling attention to our “rein-
forcement” of certain links in the causal chain, rather than insisting on a 
quasi-categorial distinction like that between “happenings” and “doings,” 
in which a “happening” is merely a relation between an object and a 
property, whereas a “doing” expresses a stronger relation.17
However, Locke is about to modify his theory of action—if not, per 
se, of motivation—in an important way, resulting in a new theory of 
freedom, and in a step away from compatibilism, the very step Collins will 
challenge. Recall Locke’s second (and crucial) account of what determines 
the will:
There being in us a great many uneasinesses, always soliciting and ready to determine 
the will, it is natural, as I have said, that the greatest and most pressing should 
determine the will to the next action; and so it does for the most part, but not always. 
(§47, emphasis mine)
“For the most part, but not always”: this is the sign of the coming modi-
fication. Hedonistic determination of our will works most of the time, but 
not always; sometimes we can simply stop the mechanism. I quote Locke’s 
new statement:
For, the mind having in most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to suspend 
the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires; and so all, one after another; is 
at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh 
them with others. In this lies the liberty man has; and from the not using of it right 
comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into in the 
conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the 
determination of our wills, and engage too soon, before due Examination. To prevent 
this, we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire; as every one 
daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this 
seems to consist that which is (as I think improperly) called free-will. For, during 
this suspension of any desire, before the will be determined to action, and the action 
(which follows that determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, 
and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due 
Examination, we have judged, we have done our duty, all that we can, or ought to 
do, in pursuit of our happiness; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, 
to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair Examination. (§47)
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He confirms some sections later that suspension is the “hinge” on which 
the new theory of freedom “turns”:
This is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings, in their constant 
endeavours after, and a steady prosecution of true felicity,—That they can suspend 
this prosecution in particular cases, till they have looked before them, and informed 
themselves whether that particular thing which is then proposed or desired lie 
in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which is their greatest 
good. . . . experience showing us, that in most cases, we are able to suspend the 
present satisfaction of any desire. (§52)
How did we get to suspension? Not by some casual intuition Locke 
suddenly remembered, about how we do stop and reflect about different 
goods frequently. Rather, Locke appeals to his distinction between active 
powers and passive powers. We know by experience that we have a power 
to change and a power to receive changes. In the realm of thinking, the 
power to receive ideas from without is the merely “passive” power, by 
the exercise of which we are patients and not agents. But we also have an 
active power, “to bring into view ideas out of sight, at one’s own choice, 
and compare which of them one thinks fit” (§72). This quote from the 
end of the chapter, precisely in the portion that was added last, provides 
the conceptual justification for what may be Locke’s key moral idea, the 
suspension of desire.
This active power applied to the moral realm is the power to suspend 
the “execution and satisfaction of [our] desires” (§47), in other words, 
the “prosecution” of an action. We are not necessarily compelled to 
attend to a present (and pressing) uneasiness, because we can reflect 
on the main source of this uneasiness, in order to know which object 
of desire we should pursue. This “suspension” of action is “the source of 
all liberty . . . which is (as I think improperly) called Free will” (§47). An 
action can be suspended until the will is determined to action; the will 
is determined to action by a judgment on which good we pursue. In 
other words, this “moment of freedom” occurs within a causal scheme in 
which we “desire, will and act according to the last result of a fair exami-
nation” (§48); this last result is very reminiscent of the final moment 
of deliberation that Hobbes compared to the feather which breaks the 
horse’s back.18
A mitigated determinism, but still a determinism, then: we can suspend 
the mechanism of desire and uneasiness and deliberate on a course of 
action, that is, we can suspend the “prosecution” of an action, but once a 
course of action has been chosen, we have to follow it. If we hadn’t noticed 
that this moment of suspension seems hard to reconcile with the rest of 
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the hedonistic scheme, Collins will call attention to this flaw or inconsis-
tency in Locke’s explanation, and cast doubt on the possibility of our 
power to somehow suspend a course of events—in other words, the possibil-
ity that in a causal chain of actions, there might be a moment that is not 
itself within the causal chain. With his unmistakable clarity and precision, 
Collins says simply that “suspending to will, is itself an act of willing; it is 
willing to defer willing about the matter propos’d” (Collins 1717, 39); and 
since Collins does not accept a categorial separation between desire and 
will, which he finds to be a traditional (Aristotelian) residue in Locke, 
he will consider any suspension of the will, being “itself an act of willing,” 
to still be determined by the causal mechanism of uneasiness.
Locke has moved from freedom as the power to do what one wills to 
do or not do, that is, not the freedom to will but to act (§§8, 23), to freedom 
understood as the ability to suspend desire, to keep it from provoking 
action (§§47, 52). If uneasiness turned out to be the only causal mechanism 
through which the Good can influence me, then for my actions to not be 
fully determined by this mechanism, I must be able to suspend the execu-
tion of my desires. Suspension is “the hinge on which turns the liberty of 
intellectual beings, in their constant endeavours after, and a steady pros-
ecution of true felicity” (§52). It sounds a lot like a “second-order freedom” 
of the sort made popular by Charles Taylor and Harry Frankfurt in con-
temporary moral philosophy. But the early modern thinker who most 
prominently defends a doctrine of freedom as a derivative state in relation 
to more primary voluntary mental states is not Locke, but Leibniz.19 For 
Locke, freedom as suspension is still not freedom to will; it is freedom 
to act in accordance with the will. It’s natural to ask whether the suspen-
sion doctrine is a departure from determinism or not.20 Indeed, in §56 
of the “Power” chapter, which he added to the fifth edition, Locke says 
the following:
Liberty ’tis plain consists in a Power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing, as 
we will. This cannot be denied. But this seeming to comprehend only the actions 
of a Man consecutive to volition, it is further inquired,—Whether he be at liberty 
to will or no? And to this it has been answered, that, in most cases, a Man is not 
at Liberty to forbear the act of volition: he must exert an act of his will, whereby 
the action proposed is made to exist or not to exist. But yet there is a case wherein 
a Man is at Liberty in respect of willing; and that is the choosing of a remote 
Good as an end to be pursued. Here a Man may suspend the act of his choice from 
being determined for or against the thing proposed, till he has examined whether 
it be really of a nature, in itself and consequences, to make him happy, or no. 
(Emphasis mine)
8838_006.indd   115 5/3/2010   3:15:52 PM
T1
Campbell—Action, Ethics, and Responsibility 
116 C. T. Wolfe
In sum, Locke’s “Power” chapter contains not one but three separate doc-
trines of freedom:
(A) freedom is determination by the Good (1st edition);
(B) given the condition of uneasiness, freedom is the suspension of desire 
(2nd edition); this allows the Good and the understanding to be 
“reintroduced”;
(C) liberty with respect to willing (5th edition), which seems to follow 
from suspension: once we suspend, we can choose one good over another, 
and once that choice is made, it raises our uneasiness accordingly.
Many commentators, Chappell most prominently, have worried about 
how to reconcile (A) with (B): how to reconcile a notion of the Good with 
a hedonistic motivational psychology. My response is that if we recall that 
the Good always means happiness, itself definable in terms of pleasure and 
the avoidance of pain, and the presence of the afterlife and its potential 
rewards and punishments cannot be excluded from hedonistic considerations, 
there seems to be almost no difficulties with reconciling these two doc-
trines. However, the situation appears to be different with doctrine (C), 
liberty “in respect to willing.” The idea appears to be blatantly inconsistent 
with the rest of the chapter. Indeed, it’s not just §56 that presents this 
difficulty; consider this statement:
Nay, were we determined by anything but the last result of our own Minds, judging 
of the good or evil of any action, we were not free; the very end of our Freedom 
being, that we may attain the good we choose. (§48)
This sentence can be simplified to read:
If our will were determined by something other than X, then it would 
not be free.
As Yaffe (2001) suggests, this can in turn be rewritten in this way (even if 
it’s simply a matter of denying the antecedent):
If our will is determined by X, it is free.
If only in terms of Locke’s own rhetoric in the early sections of the 
chapter, one cannot help but point out that he had claimed to be dispens-
ing with the notion of free will, for good . . . and here he is entertaining 
a version of it, however revised. What should we make, then, of Locke’s 
apparent insouciance?
The naively biographical approach would be to say that Locke first 
asserted (in a rather orthodox, Scholastic way) that we are determined by 
the Good; then he was radicalized in a hedonistic direction by reading 
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Gassendi during his stay in Montpellier (indeed, his first essays on pleasure 
and pain are exactly contemporary with this reading); lastly, frightened by 
the possible consequences of this doctrine, he jerry-rigs a device by which 
we are again “free” faced with the various micro-determinisms, whether 
hedonistic or just plain unconscious.21
In contrast to this approach, I would present a case for the “enduring” 
status of determination in his chapter (a more “determinist” reading of 
Locke, then) for two reasons, ranked in increasing order of importance:
(1) Suspension is not really the opposite or contrary of uneasiness, as 
one might think; rather, it emerges out of uneasiness (an emergence that 
would not have been conceivable or allowable for earlier suspension 
theorists; Locke, in contrast, allows that the stirrings of desire have not 
only intentional content but reflexive content). Thus it is not a mere 
grafting on of libertarian elements into a formerly compatibilist view. 
Because there are multiple stimuli, we need to be able to pick and 
choose between them; or, better put, suspension supervenes on the 
“multiple conative elements”22 of uneasiness, and is thus not 
tantamount to “indifference,” which is the contrary of uneasiness; it 
does not reintroduce true divisions in the mind. James Tully uses 
different language and emphasis to similarly nuance Locke’s shift from 
determination-by-the-Good to hedonism as a motivational theory:
Locke argues that his first view cannot be true, because if it were everyone who has 
considered Christianity would be an unfailing Christian in practice. This is so since 
they would be aware that heaven and hell outweigh all other good and evil, and so 
they would be motivated to live a Christian life to gain infinite pleasure and avoid 
infinite pain. Yet it obviously is true that everyone who has considered Christianity 
is not a practising Christian, therefore the greater good in view does not determine 
the will. (Tully 1988, 47)
(2) Locke never ceases to deny freedom as indifference, which leads him 
to formulate a new part of his doctrine: the determination of our will  
by the last judgment of our understanding is a “perfection of our 
nature” (§47) rather than a “restraint or diminution of freedom” (§48).  
Much like the “practical” argument against indifference in terms  
of self-preservation, Locke thinks it is a perfection to be determined:
A man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it rest quiet: he is perfectly 
indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted 
that power, if he were deprived of that indifferency. But it would be as great an 
imperfection, if he had the same indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting 
up his hand, or its remaining in rest, when it would save his head or eyes from 
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a blow he sees coming: it is as much a perfection, that desire, or the power of 
preferring, should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined 
by the will; and the certainer such determination is, the greater is the perfection. (§48, 
emphasis mine)23
In sum, Locke has put forth both a powerful critique of mainstream 
theories of freedom and the will, with his concept of “uneasiness,” and he 
seems to have retreated from the (hedonistic) deterministic implications 
of this concept, with his claim that there are moments when we can 
suspend all such determination and be free “with respect to willing.” At 
the same time, partly owing to the theological overtones of his moral 
philosophy, he thinks it is a perfection that we are in fact determined in 
our actions, and an unavoidable one. Based on the textual complexities 
and variations in the “Power” chapter of the Essay, one could defend dif-
ferent versions of compatibilism in Locke. Namely, one could defend a 
moral theory in which we are determined by the Good; or one could view 
Locke as the originator of Frankfurt-style “second-order” freedom (although 
as I have noted, Leibniz is a better author to pin this doctrine on); lastly, 
one could focus on Locke’s notion of uneasiness and show how it opens 
on to a coherent and psychologically fine-grained determinism. It is the latter 
theory that I find most compelling, and it was this approach that was taken 
by Locke’s radical friend and disciple, Anthony Collins.
Collins seized upon Locke’s notion of uneasiness, bolstered it meta-
physically with various determinist arguments drawn from Hobbes, 
Spinoza, Leibniz, and Bayle (principally an “argument from experience” 
and an “argument from causality”), and challenged any type of “suspen-
sion” or “liberty with respect to willing” as being inconsistent with uneasi-
ness. In doing so, he puts forth a powerful and original form of determinism 
that does not neglect the conceptual and empirical particularities of the 
world of action, contrary to most discussions in action theory or the phi-
losophy of science, which tend to ignore one another—one may term 
Collins’s position a “volitional determinism”;24 he himself speaks of “moral 
necessity,” taking a term from the incompatibilist, libertarian vocabulary 
used notably by Samuel Clarke:
I contend only for what is called moral necessity, meaning thereby, that man, who 
is an intelligent and sensible being, is determined by his reason and his senses; and 
I deny man to be subject to such necessity, as is in clocks, watches and other beings 
which for want of sensation and intelligence are subject to an absolute, physical or 
mechanical necessity. (Collins 1717, preface, iii)
It is not possible here to go into further details about Collins’s doctrine, 
which significantly anticipates the “Hume–Mill” thesis (later defended by 
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thinkers such as Moritz Schlick, A. J. Ayer, and J. J. C. Smart25) according 
to which an agent is causally determined by her beliefs, desires, and other 
mental states, in a way that forms an adequate basis for a moral theory. 
Put differently, even if there are really are “rationality relations” between 
beliefs and desires on the one hand and behavior on the other hand, it 
does not follow that beliefs and desires do not cause behavior (Churchland 
1986, 304); this is why our actions are not fully random. Quine, for one, 
credited Spinoza and Hume with this view:
Like Spinoza, Hume and so many others, I count an act as free insofar as the agent’s 
motives or drives are a link in its causal chain. These motives or drives may them-
selves be as rigidly determined as you please. (Quine 1995, 199)
But most contemporary scholars and action theorists tend to attribute 
this view to “Hume and subsequent compatibilists”26; my point as regards 
this historical claim is that Locke actually first lays out the conditions 
for such a view, and that Collins expresses it in full, a generation 
before Hume. 
In addition to the “character-causal” claim, Locke and Collins also make 
the classic deflationary point that our everyday ways of talking, in which 
we are not caused by the reasons for our action because we reflected on 
these reasons, so that “if a man’s behavior is rational, it cannot be deter-
mined by the state of his glands or any other antecedent causal factors,”27 
are precisely just façons de parler and do not reflect any underlying “joints” 
of things. They would undoubtedly agree with Daniel Wegner that our 
experience of free will is “the way our minds portray their operations to 
us, not their actual operation” (Wegner 2002, 96). In this sense, Lockean–
Collinsian volitional determinism could be true even if the universe as a 
whole is not deterministic, for example, at the quantum level: universal 
physical determinism plus supervenience of the mental on the physical 
entails psychological determinism, but the reverse does not hold.28 
Contemporary claims that compatibilism is inherently self-contradictory 
because determinism implies a total lack of control over any part of 
the universe and its laws, whether made in support of libertarian free 
will (van Inwagen) or of determinism (Galen Strawson), are impressive 
in their metaphysical coherence but, curiously for moral philosophy, seem 
to ignore those specific features of psychological life that these early 
modern philosophers took seriously, and which impact directly on moral 
considerations. They seem to ignore that “even in a deterministic world, 
not all thieves are kleptomaniacs,” in Saul Smilansky’s evocative phrase 
(Smilansky, this volume).
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I have tried to outline the complexity of Locke’s views on action and 
indicate how they formed the basis for a new and less-known form of 
determinism—a uniquely “volitional” determinism that recognizes the 
specific complexity of mental life, or psychological events, since after all, 
“determinism alone does not tell us what laws or kinds of laws take human 
acts as their dependent variables” (Goldman 1970, 173). The shift from 
the will understood as an autonomous, self-transparent faculty to the will 
as a “power” is also a kind of “psychologization” (understood as a form of 
naturalization), since the notion of a faculty implies a kind of autonomy 
and distinction from the natural world, whereas a power is a “Newtonian” 
concept, which applies equally to the physical and the psychological 
realms, as is evident in Locke’s various examples.
Both Locke and Collins reject, preemptively, anything like agent causa-
tion, or a basic distinction between reasons and causes. Unlike a pure 
physicalistically driven determinist like Hobbes, they offer a fine-grained 
account of volitional determinism and other motivational “pressures.” The 
suspension of desire is not, then, a suspension of determinism.
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Notes
1. Locke 1975, Book II, chapter xxi, §11. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations 
from Locke are from this chapter and are simply given as section (§) numbers.
2. Collins 1717, 22.
3. Clarke 1738/1978, 723.
4. “Pleasure, Pain, the Passions,” in Locke 1997, 244.
5. Of course, the term “compatibilism” is quite broad; thinkers as different as 
Spinoza and Leibniz (in addition to Locke) can both safely be described as compati-
bilists. In fact, what it meant to be a compatibilist in the early modern period was 
less specific than now, if it is the case that compatibilists “typically hold either that 
free will is compatible with deterministic causal laws at the psychological level, or 
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that even if there are no such laws, every psychological event is still causally deter-
mined through being token-identical with some physical event which falls under 
the laws of physics” (Borst 1992, 57).
6. Law, in King 1731/1739, 253ff., n. 45.
7. Locke had acknowledged how much he had revised the chapter in the “Epistle 
to the Reader”: “I have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had 
concerning that, which gives the last determination to the Will in all voluntary 
actions” (11).
8. Collins was extremely close to Locke in the last years of his life, and their 
correspondence is both moving and filled with provocative insights, not least on 
theological matters. Locke wrote to Collins that “if I were now setting out in the 
world I should think it my great happiness to have such a companion as you who 
had a true relish of truth . . . and to whom I might communicate what I thought 
true freely”; as for strictly intellectual kinship, “I know nobody that understands 
[my book] so well, nor can give me better light concerning it” (Letters of October 
29, 1703 and April 3, 1704, letters 3361 and 3504 in Locke 1976–1989, vol. 8, 
97, 263).
9. Molyneux to Locke, December 22, 1692, letter 1579 in Locke 1976–1989, vol. 4, 
600–601. (James Tully points out that the criticism was first suggested by William 
King, the Archbishop of Dublin, then relayed by Molyneux, who discussed it at 
length with Locke; see Tully 1988, 47.)
10. Letter 1655 (August 23, 1693), in Locke 1976–1989, vol. 4, 722.
11. Locke, “Pleasure, Pain, the Passions,” in Locke 1997, 243.
12. That is, not hard determinism, in which “a complete description of the state of 
the world at any given time and a complete statement of the laws of nature together 
entail every truth as to what events happen after that time”(Ginet 1990, 92). A less 
fortunate definition of soft determinism is Paul Russell’s “compatibilism plus the 
belief that determinism is true” (Russell 1995, 83 n. 20).
13. Locke 1975, II.xxi.35 (the quotation is from Ovid, Metamorphoses, VII, 20–21; it 
is Medea speaking, about killing her children). Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza also 
quote this passage.
14. §29, in the first edition only (p. 248n.); in the final edition, this phrase is the 
entry in the table of contents for §§25–27. See Vere Chappell’s contribution to 
Sleigh, Chappell, and Della Rocca 1998, 1250–1251, and Chappell 1994, 201.
15. Leibniz to Coste, December 19, 1707 (the “letter on human freedom”), in 
Leibniz 1989, 194–195.
16. Locke to van Limborch, August 12, 1701, letter 2979 in Locke 1976–1989, 408.
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17. Gideon Yaffe, in his elegant, thought-provoking but anachronistic work Liberty 
Worth the Name (Yaffe 2000), suggests the above distinction and appeals to it fre-
quently but inconsistently. I disagree with Yaffe’s reading of Locke on action, on a 
fundamental level: Yaffe’s Locke holds that we are determined by the Good, whereas 
Locke as I read him places the emphasis on determined.
18. Hobbes 1839–1845, vol. 4, 247, and Hobbes 1999, 34. Collins uses the same 
image (Collins 1717, 49).
19. Vailati 1990, 226, n. 50. See Leibniz 1982, II.xxi.23.
20. Sleigh, Chappell, and Della Rocca 1998, 1250. Yaffe (2001, 387, n. 2) remarks 
nicely that suspension is really an idea Locke takes over from the libertarian or 
incompatibilist position, particularly Malebranche, whereas his initial doctrine of 
freedom as the absence of constraint on action was more compatibilist, closer to 
Hobbes. With respect to Collins’s critique, this implies that, depending on which 
edition of the Essay one looks at, one finds a more or less determinist Locke; 
thus one could conceivably construct an alternate Locke who would not be (as) 
vulnerable to the reductionist “streamlining” offered by Collins.
21. One of Leibniz’s chief criticisms of Locke’s moral psychology is that he 
leaves out (or is unaware of) the entire unconscious dimension of mental life (see 
Leibniz 1982, II.xx.6). In fact, in various texts written parallel to the Essay, including 
his correspondence with Jean Le Clerc, Locke shows that he is quite aware of the 
subpersonal levels of uneasiness.
22. Borrowing this expression from Dretske (1988), p. 138.
23. In this sense Locke is closer to Calvinism than, notably, his friend and corre-
spondent Philipp van Limborch, the head of the Remonstrant Arminian congrega-
tion in Amsterdam. (Remonstrants or Arminians were followers of Jacobus Arminius 
[1560–1609], who scandalized the Calvinists by claiming that our wills are at least 
sufficiently free that we can rationally be subjected to persuasion and punishment 
[hence salvation through works].)
24. I take this term from Chappell (1998, 86). He uses it to mean the thesis that we 
are not free in willing; I agree, but extend the term to mean a metaphysical thesis, 
a variant of determinism that focuses on volitions, and thereby action, and thereby 
the mind, in contrast to a “physicalist” (or “Laplacean”) determinism that denies 
the existence of this level of action, or at least seeks to reduce it to a lower-level 
explanation.
25. The Hume-Mill thesis is what van Inwagen (1983) calls “the Mind argument”—
because its classic formulation in the twentieth century came primarily in three 
papers published in Mind over two and a half decades, by Hobart (1934), Nowell-
Smith (1948), and Smart (1961, 1984), in addition to Ayer (1954) and Schlick 
(1930/1939).
8838_006.indd   122 5/3/2010   3:15:52 PM
T1
Campbell—Action, Ethics, and Responsibility 
John Locke’s Compatibilism 123
26. Dupré 2001, 178. The same statement about the Hume–Mill thesis can be 
found, e.g., in Ginet 1990, O’Connor 1995, and Russell 1995. Winkler (1998), §3, 
is one of the few scholars who recognizes Collins’s anticipation of Hume. For more 
on Collins’s “volitional determinism” see Wolfe 2007.
27. MacIntyre 1957, 35; cf. O’Connor 1995, 196.
28. I owe the latter formulation to an anonymous reviewer.
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